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FILING OF RESPONSE 
Plaintiff's Response to Defendants' Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari is filed purusant to Rule 47, R. Utah S. Ct. 
REPLY TO DEFENDANTS1 STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendants' statement of facts is obviously not meant to 
be a comprehensive summary of the material facts on which 
this case is based. For purposes of determining whether 
Berube v. Fashion Centre Inc. Ltd., 77il P.2d 1033 (Utah 
1989), should be given retroactive application, the factual 
details are probably not material. (Tike material facts are 
laid out in detail in Plaintiff's original appral brief to 
the Utah Court of Appeals.) 
However, Fact No. 3 in Defendants' statement requires a 
response. The statement is imcomplete and, therefore, 
inaccurate because it is misleading. plaintiff Gilmore was 
hired by Defendant Salt Lake Community Action Program on 
March 6, 1974, in the temporary position of accountant. 
There is no question that at this poin^ Gilmore was indeed 
an at-will employee. However, on or atiout September 9, 
1974, he was promoted to the position df fiscal director in 
a probationary status. He became a permanent employee in 
the position of fiscal director on or dbout January 1, 1975. 
[These facts are uncontroverted. See R. 53-54. See also 
Position & Salary Record and Requests f|or Salary Payroll 
Change documents, which are included ii Schultz deposition 
Exhibit P-36 and Gilmore deposition Exhibit D-3.] It was 
when Gilmore became a permanent employee that his employment 
relationship with Defendants began to be covered by the 
personnel policies manual. The fact that he was originally 
a temporary at-will employee does not affect the fact that 
when he bacame a permanent employee both he and the 
Defendants became bound by the terms of the policy manual. 
SUMMARY OF PLAINTIFF'S ARGUMENT 
The general rule is that the ruling of the court states 
the nature of the law both retroactively and prospectively. 
Utah departs from retroactive application only when it can 
be shown that parties would have justifiably relied on 
previous law or decisions or when retroactive application 
would unduly burden the administration of justice. 
Defendants have made no claim that they ever relied on a 
belief that they did not have to comply with the personnel 
policies manual they voluntarily promulgated. Nor have they 
shown that a retroactive application of Berube would unduly 
burden the administration of justice. They have claimed 
that it would unduly burden them but that has never been 
recognized as a reason to refuse retroactive application of 
a ruling. 
To deny retroactive application of Berube would penalize 
Gilmore for not getting to the courthouse first. 
To apply Berube retroactively would do nothing more than 
hold the Defendants to the promises they made. Their only 
argument against that would be that they never intended to 
be bound by their promises, an argument that obvioulsy 
cannot be accepted. 
REPLY TO DEFENDANTS1 ARGUMENT 
THE BERUBE CASE SHOULD APPLY RETROACTIVELY TO 
THE INSTANT CASE. 
In reversing the lower court's summary judgment for 
Defendants, the Utah Court of Appeals elied on Berube v. 
Fashion Centre Inc. Ltd, supra, a case whose facts and 
course in the lower court are remarkably similar to the 
instant case. Defendants, in their p^+-^ion to this court 
for writ of certiorari, argue that Berikbe should not be 
applied retroactively to the instant c^se. In so arguing, 
Defendants have quoted so selectively irrom among cases on 
the subject of retroactivity that the picture presented can 
at best be described as incomplete. 
Defendants, for instance, ignore Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 
661 (Utah 1984), a significant Utah ca^e on the question of 
retroactivity and a case similar to th^ instant case 
concerning that issue. In Malan, the Jjower court granted 
summary judgment to defendants on the grounds that the Utah 
Guest Statute (which had previously be^n held consti-
tutional) precluded plaintiff's suit. Dn appeal, the Utah 
Supreme Court reversed earlier positioris that the Guest 
Statute was constitutional, held the s^tute 
unconstitutional and ordered a trial fo|r plaintiffs. 
Defendants petitioned for a rehearing, contending that the 
ruling that the statute was now unconstitutional should be 
applied prospectively only. The court denied the petition 
for rehearing, defining the Utah position on retroactivity: 
The general rule from time immemorial is that 
the ruling of a court is deemed to state the true 
nature of the law both retroactively and 
prospectively... in the vast majority of cases a 
decision is effective both prospectively and 
retrospectively, even an overruling 
decision...Whether the general rule should be 
departed from depends on whether a substantial 
injustice would occur... 
We may, in our discretion, prohibit retroactive 
operation where the 'overruled law has been 
justifiably relied upon or where retroactive 
operation creates a burden.' Loyal Order of Moose, 
657 P.2d at 265... 
The defendants in this case do not argue that 
they justifiably relied on our prior decisions 
sustaining the constitutionality of the Guest 
Statute. There is no evidence that the defendants 
knew of the Guest Statute and relied upon it in 
offering a ride to the plaintiff. The bare 
assertion by defendants that our decision overrules 
prior cases sustaining the constitutionality of the 
Guest Statute is insufficient to prohibit its 
retroactive application. [At 676; emphasis added.] 
MaIan was quoted and followed in the later case of Belden 
v. Dalbo Inc., 752 P.2d 1317 (Uth App. 1988). 
The Defendants rely on McFarland v. Skaggs Companies 
Inc., 678 P.2d 298 (Utah 1984), where the court discussed 
whether a new actual malace standard should be applied 
prospectively only. The court did discuss the general rule 
as quoted in Defendants1 petition but Defendants failed to 
quote the application of the general rule in that case. The 
court declined to limit the application of the new standard 
to future cases only, pointing out: "There is no showing of 
reliance upon the former standard or cjf any resulting burden 
to the administration of justice. We therefore hold that 
the Sunburst doctrine does not preclude application of the 
new 'actual malace' standard in the present case." [At 305.] 
Likewise, in the instant case, Defplants have shown no 
reliance on the pre-Berube standard nor have they shown any 
great burden on the administration of justice that would 
result from a retroactive application if Berube. Under the 
MaIan case, their bare assertions are insufficient to 
prohibit retroactive application. If Plaintiff Gilmore 
prevails, the fact that Defendants would face "the 
possibility of judgment for Gilmore*s back pay in a 
catastrophic amount" (as they describe it in their petition) 
is not the type of burden on the administration of justice 
that a prospective-only-application is designed to avoid. 
It may be a burden on Defendants but i^ is not a burden on 
the administration of justice. Defendants could have 
avoided such a "catastrophic" burden simply by following the 
rules that they themselves promulgated and discharging 
Gilmore properly. See Timpanogos Planrjing & Water 
Management v. Central Utah Water Conservancy District, 690 
P.2d 562 (Utah 1984), for a discussior on what constitutes a 
burden on the administration of justice. 
In Timpanogos, members of certain boards had been 
appointed by a method later found unconstitutional. The 
court ruled that giving that determination retroactive 
application would call into question al|l of the actions 
taken by the board and would unreasonably burden the 
administration of justice. That would not be the situation 
in the instant case. The Supreme Court in MaIan 
specifically rejected Timpanogos as support for a 
prospective-only-appiication of the Guest Statute ruling, 
pointing out that the ruling in Timpanogos was prospective 
only because of the actual reliance on the statute by 
various entities. 
The Supreme Court had earlier discussed the standards 
concerning retroactivity in criminal cases in Andrews v. 
Morris, 677 P.2d 81 (Utah 1983), and "explicitely 
adopted[ed] the following analytic standards for determining 
the retroactivity of new rules...:1) the purpose to be 
served by the new rule; 2) the extent of reliance on the old 
rule, and 3) the effect on the administration of justice of 
a retoractive application of the new rule. " [At 91.] 
Although these were the standards for examining the 
question in a criminal case, they can easily be adapted in 
the analysis of a civil case. 
Defendants cite Bimbo v. Burdette Tomlin Memorial 
Hospital, 644 F.Supp. 1033 (D.N.J. 1986), as support for 
their claim that courts in other jurisdictions have ruled 
that modifications to the employment at will doctine will 
operate prospectively only. In Bimbo, the federal court in 
New Jersey refused prospective application of a New Jersey 
Supreme Court case, Woolley v.Hoffman-LaRoche Inc., 491 A.2d 
1257 (N.J. 1985), which had for the first time recognized an 
exception to the at-will doctrine bas^H on a contract 
implied from a policy manual (as Berufle has done in Utah). 
However, the New Jersey state court specifically rejected 
this federal court interpretation of ijts law in Cole v. 
Carteret Savings Bank, 540 A. 2d 923 (Nl. J. Super .L. 1988): 
"This court respectfully disagrees with that holding [in 
Bimbo] and concludes that the Supreme 3ourt in Woolley 
intended to include all claimants." T|ie court also pointed 
out that the New Jersey Supreme Court in Rutherford 
Education Assn. v. Board of Ed., 489 A|. 2d 1148 (N.J. 1985), 
had thoroughly analyzed the retroactive-prospective 
application of its decisions: 
Not only is it made clear that retoractive 
application is presumed, but a rerview of the 
various factors the court listed to apply in such 
test, makes it abundantly clear 
implied contract would be the type of justifiable 
claim that would be considered 
927; emphasis added.] 
that a breach of an 
retroactively. [At 
The propsective application of the Wpoley case was 
explored again in Grigoletti v. Ortho Pharmeceutical, 545 
A.2d 185 (N.J.Super.A.D. 1988): 
The theory underpinning prospective 
application of important changes in the law is that 
retroactivity is unfair to those who relied on the 
prior state of the law...Here, plaintiffs contend 
that Ortho voluntarily published a set of employment 
promises in the manual upon which the plaintiffs 
relied and that Ortho failed to live up to those 
promises. Assuming that these claims are 
established, Ortho1s only unfairness defense to the 
retroactive application of Wooley would have to be 
that it never intended to live up to the promises 
contained in the manual it published, and upon which 
its employes allegedly relied. That argument will 
not wash. If plaintiffs are proved, there would be 
nothing unfair about holding Ortho to workplace 
standards it voluntarily promulgated. [At 189; 
emphasis added.] 
Defendants also cite Virgil v. Arzola, 699 P.2d 613 (N.M. 
App. 1983), for their prospective-only-application position. 
Two earlier New Mexico cases, Forrester v. Parker, 606 P.2d 
648 (N.M. 1980), and Hernandez v. Home Educ. Livelihood 
Program, 645 P.2d 1381 (N.M. App. 1982), had recognized 
employee manuals as a basis for breach of employment 
contract claims (as Berube did). In neither of these cases 
did the courts refuse retroactive application of the ruling. 
In Virgil it was a new tort cause of action for retaliatory 
discharge based on public policy to which the court gave a 
"modified prospective application.'1 What Defendants fail 
to point out to this court in their petition is that the New 
Mexico Supreme Court explained and expanded on what was 
meant by "modified prospective application" in the later 
case of Boudar v. E.G. & G. Inc., 742 P.2d 491 (N.M. 1987). 
The court ruled that the Virgil holding (recognizing the new 
public policy exception to the at-will doctine) was to be 
applicalble to all cases filed on or before the date of the 
Virgil opinion so long as trial of the case had not been 
completed before the date of the Virgil opinion. [At 492-
493.] Therefore, even if this court were to adopt the 
Virgil position of modified prospective application, Berube 
would apply to the Gilmore case. 
On page 11 of their petition Defendants cite four cases 
where rulings were given prospective Application only. None 
shed any light on the instant questior}. Merely listing past 
cases where prospective-application-onjly was ordered is not 
support for prospect ive-only-applicati|on in a later case. 
It is the reasoning why prospective-on|ly-application was 
denied or ordered that is significant land Defendants cannot 
show any reasoning in those cases cite^ l that is applicable 
to the instant case. 
It is also interesting to note that the federal district 
court in Utah has already been called |ipon to determine 
whether Berube should be applied retroactively in Howcroft 
v. Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co. 712 F.Supp. 
1514 (D.Utah 1989). A hearing in that case was held prior 
to Berube and the court had drafted a tentative opinion. 
After Berube was entered, the court asfced for briefs taking 
Berube into account. Defendants argued that Berube should 
not be applied retroactively but the court ruled: 
In Berube, the Utah Supremb Court 
implicitely determined that the decision was 
to be applied retroactively. The court 
remanded the case for trial on 
recognized theory instead of merely 
announcing that the theory would be 
i% 151! 
the newly 
jre
.d
recognized in future cases. [AJt 9.] 
Plaintiff recognizes that the Utah Supreme Court is not 
bound by the federal district court's interpretation of its 
rulings but submits that the federal district court 
correctly read the Berube ruling. 
To refuse retroactive application of Berube to the 
Gilmore case would be to penalize Gilmore for not getting to 
the courthouse first. See Boudar v. E.G. & G. Inc., supra, 
at 492. If Gilmore proves his claims, Defendants will only 
be penalized for not living up to promises they voluntarily 
promulgated in their personnel manual. Griqoletti v. Ortho 
Pharmeceutical, supra, at 189. 
RELIEF SOUGHT 
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff respectfully asks this 
court: 
1. To deny Defendants' petition for writ of certiorari, 
or, if the petition is granted, to rule that the Berube case 
does have retroactive application; 
2. To award Plaintiff costs pursuant to Rule 34, R. Utah 
S. Ct. 
DATED: ^ ~ ^^-~'S~C\ 
Nann Novinski-Durando 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
DATED , f^-yf 
^ -
Miner 
Attorney for Plaintif 
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